Summary: We are all susceptible to conspiratorial thinking when our identity feels threatened and our emotions run high.
Source: NTNU
Joe Biden is the president of the United States, yet half of the country’s Republicans believe the election was stolen. Conspiracy theories are widespread on the other side of the Atlantic, but they are not limited to any one country or culture.
Conspiracy thinking is not confined to those who storm the U.S. Capitol.
“Everyone believes at least one conspiracy theory,” says Asbjørn Dyrendal, a professor in NTNU’s Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies who studies conspiracy theories.
The more conspiracy claims you list, the more likely someone will endorse at least one of them.
American researcher Joseph Uscinski from the University of Miami suggests that everyone endorses at least one conspiracy theory. Dyrendal largely agrees but refines the idea: people tend to believe conspiratorial ideas to some extent, even if only a little.
You may not believe the Earth is flat or that the Moon landings were staged by 400,000 people. You may reject claims that vaccines cause autism on purpose or that 5G scrambles your mind—though those theories still have adherents.
When our identity feels under threat and our emotions are strong, we are more prone to accept what we already want to be true. This dynamic is similar to the emotional investment many people have in sports.
These everyday reactions employ the same psychological mechanisms that can, over time, solidify into more entrenched conspiracy beliefs.
“Maybe you think the referee is biased against your football team, especially when a clear penalty isn’t called,” Dyrendal explains. If you begin to see a pattern—your team rarely receives penalties—you may conclude referees are deliberately against you.
That kind of thinking doesn’t automatically become a full-blown conspiracy theory, but the same cognitive processes—pattern-seeking, emotional reasoning and confirmation bias—can escalate thoughts into stronger conspiratorial beliefs.
Conspiratorial thinking exists on a spectrum. There is a difference between shouting at a referee in the heat of the moment and embracing the most far-fetched claims.
People who hold conspiracy beliefs can be found everywhere, perhaps even reflected in your own mirror.
“But several common traits recur,” says Dyrendal.
Research shows conspiracy believers tend to:
- have slightly lower levels of formal education;
- be more common in societies with weaker democratic institutions, which affects trust in others and in authorities;
- belong to groups that feel underrepresented or that should have more influence;
- be somewhat more likely to be members of particular political or religious groups;
- rely more on intuition or “gut feelings” when making decisions;
- perceive connections where others do not and are more likely to attribute events to deliberate intent;
- show marginally higher levels of narcissism and paranoia;
- and more often obtain information from social media.
“We’ve noticed that conspiracy adherents are somewhat more likely to get their news from social media,” Dyrendal says.
Social platforms can reinforce existing beliefs. Their structure tends to create echo chambers where you mostly see content from friends and sources you already agree with. Likes and clicks shape future content, making it easy to confirm suspicions and find communities that share your perspective.
Still, blaming Facebook or Twitter alone is an oversimplification. It may feel like more people than ever accept peculiar conspiracy claims, but we lack solid evidence that belief in conspiracies has uniformly increased.
You might assume men are more prone to conspiracy beliefs than women, but large surveys do not show consistent gender differences in overall conspiratorial thinking.
“When we examine many different conspiracy theories, we find no reliable gender gap in average scores,” Dyrendal notes.
However, who believes which theories can vary. Differences often relate less to gender and more to attitudes about social hierarchy.
“People who oppose equality and favor hierarchical social order tend to view themselves and their group as superior, and are more likely to endorse conspiracies that target perceived out-groups,” Dyrendal explains.
That preference for clear social ranking often translates into prejudice against groups seen as lower in status or threatening to the established order.
“These individuals more readily accept conspiracies about immigration, supposed Jewish dominance, Muslims and similar narratives, and this pattern appears slightly stronger among men,” Dyrendal adds.
A defining feature of many conspiracy believers is membership in groups that distrust government and contemporary social norms.
“If you belong to a group that already anticipates doomsday scenarios or the arrival of a savior, it’s easier to adopt related conspiracy claims,” Dyrendal says.
For example, some evangelical Christians in the United States may more readily accept conspiratorial ideas that fit within a broader narrative of end-times and cosmic struggle between good and evil. From that perspective, it’s a short step to view certain politicians as agents of malevolent forces.
Members of QAnon—who believe Trump was battling a secret cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles that included Hillary Clinton—were among those who attacked the U.S. Capitol. Yet QAnon followers make up a relatively small fraction of the U.S. population, even if absolute numbers can seem large in a country of 330 million people.
“In a country with hundreds of millions of people, even a small percentage translates into large numbers,” Dyrendal points out.
Uscinski’s long-term tracking of QAnon suggests the movement has not grown consistently in recent years; many of its ideas were already circulating widely before being gathered under the QAnon label.
The crowd that attacked the Capitol included many different kinds of people, not just members of a single extremist group. And when half of a major political party claims widespread electoral fraud—despite rejection by election officials—that reflects something broader than mere membership in fringe movements.
Conspiracy beliefs are not simply the product of poverty or powerlessness. The relationships are complex. “Trump supporters may be less educated on average, but they can have higher incomes,” Dyrendal notes. Media portrayals that reduce supporters to backward, disadvantaged rural voters do not capture the whole picture.
Most people are not as extreme as the minority of the most outlandish believers. For example, 96% of Norwegians vaccinate their children.
Dyrendal confesses he still hasn’t forgiven the referee from the 1975 European Cup final between Leeds and Bayern Munich.
Bayern won 2–0 after the referee disallowed Peter Lorimer’s goal, ruled Billy Bremner offside, and twice failed to award a penalty to Leeds. Dyrendal jokingly adds that French referees must despise British teams and are easy to bribe—an ironic nod to how quickly suspicions can escalate into conspiratorial thinking.
About this psychology research news
Source: NTNU
Contact: Asbjørn Dyrendal – NTNU
Image: The image is in the public domain
Original Research: Open access.
Predictors of belief in conspiracy theory: The role of individual differences in schizotypal traits, paranormal beliefs, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality by Asbjørn Dyrendal et al., Personality and Individual Differences. DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110645
Abstract
Predictors of belief in conspiracy theory: The role of individual differences in schizotypal traits, paranormal beliefs, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality
Numerous predictors of belief in conspiracy theories have been empirically supported. This study examines the relative contributions of individual differences—schizotypal personality dimensions, social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), paranormal beliefs (PB) and the newer construct of conspiracy mentality (CM)—to belief in conspiracy theories. Using path analysis on a large convenience sample (N = 883, 62% women) of Norwegian students, the study explores mediating effects and gender moderation within a specified model. Odd Beliefs and Paranoid Ideation (schizotypal dimensions) predicted different mediators, and their influence on belief in conspiracy theories was fully mediated. The mediators (SDO, RWA, PB, and CM) each uniquely predicted conspiracy belief, with conspiracy mentality contributing most strongly for both sexes. Exploratory gender analyses suggest the model differs between men and women. The results highlight the particular predictive power of conspiracy mentality in accounting for belief in conspiracy theories.